Servius on the Speech of Anchises

Category: ?

Servius, Commentary on Vergil’s Aeneid 703–751


There is a hirmos1 in this passage, i.e. a single line of thought continued over many verses. In it, Vergil treats Plato’s dogma about the soul (gr. perì psukhês), which is laid down in the Phaedo.2 Vergil talks about this subject concisely in the Georgics,3 and at greater length here. Varro has also treated the same issue very fully in the first book of the Divine Matters.4 This is what it contains:

When Aeneas was going through the underworld, he discerned a certain river in a more remote place, which an innumerable mass of souls was proceeding towards. He asked his father Anchises what river it was, and why the souls were going towards it. The father said, “It is the river Lethe, and they go there in order to submit to forgetfulness, in order to begin to wish to return into bodies.” Dumbfounded, Aeneas asks, “Tell me father, can it be that even the souls which have endured so many punishments on account of their previous life have a wish to return into bodies? It is not plausible that, after they are freed from the prison of the body, they should return to a connection with it.” Having undertaken this account, Anchises renders it:5 “First, there is the necessity of it happening that they return, then the ability, then the wish. Because these things are obscure, they are understood under those subdivisions. What is the necessity? All living beings trace their origin to The God,6 and since we perceive that they are born, they doubtless return7—for from where are all things procreated? Then, the ability is proved as follows: since souls are immortal, they are such that they are able to return. The third point is whether they wish: which is said to happen through the river Lethe.” And this is what he intends to say, but the further issues that arise from there create obscurity.

1 A rhetorical trope, for which the First Speech or a part of it was a standard example; see page 2.

2 One of Plato’s most popular dialogues, in which he seeks to prove the immortality of the soul. Beyond accepting this dogma (‘opinion’), Vergil did not follow Plato very closely at all. There are three surviving ancient commentaries on the Phaedo, all later than Servius (who lived in the early 5th century ce); see Westerink (XXXX).

3 Servius is referring to Vergil’s Georgics 4.219–227; see App. 2.

4 This book is lost but was a standard reference work for Servius and his older contemporary, St. Augustine, who often cites it in the City of God. Varro’s views were essentially Stoic (see App. 1), Vergil combined Platonic and Stoic elements.

5 This is a paraphrase of the First Speech, but more of a reworking than a summary.

6 Not ‘God’ or the Platonic demiurge, but the Stoic Jupiter, the all-pervading World Soul of Cosmic God.

7 I.e. are reborn.

Latin text (ed. …)

hirmos est hoc loco, id est unus sensus protentus per multos versus: in quo tractat de Platonis dogmate, quod in Phaedone positum est περὶ ψυχῆς, de quo in Georgicis strictim, hic latius loquitur. de qua re etiam Varro in primo Divinarum plenissime tractavit. Hoc autem continet:

Aeneas dum per inferos pergeret, respexit fluvium quendam loci remotioris, ad quem innumera multitudo tendebat animarum. Interrogavit patrem qui esset fluvius vel qua ratione ad eum pergerent animae. Pater ait: ‘Lethaeus est; pergunt autem ut potent et oblivionem patiantur, ut incipiant in corpora velle remeare.’ Stupefactus Aeneas interrogat: ‘dic pater, et animae quae propter praeteritam vitam tot supplicia pertulerunt possunt habere votum revertendi in corpora? Non est verisimile liberatas de corporis carcere ad eius nexum reverti.’ Suscepta narratione haec Anchises exsequitur: ‘primo debere fieri ut redeant, deinde posse, deinde volle. Quae quoniam obscura sunt, aliis subdivisionibus innotescunt. Quid est debere? Cuncta animalia a deo originem ducunt. Quae quia nasci cernimus, revertuntur sine dubio; nam unde cuncta procreantur? Deinde posse sic probat: quia immortales sunt animae, et sunt quae possunt reverti. Tertium est utrum velint: quod dicit fieri per Lethaeum fluvium.’ Et hoc quod dicturus est, sed incidentes quaestiones faciunt obscuritatem.

Summary paraphrase:
Servius, Commentary on Vergil’s Aeneid 6.724–751


(1) Anchises, having been asked why the souls would want to return to bodies, first seems to speak about something else, but then returns to the topic.

(2) What is called tò pân (‘the all, the universe’) in Greek, i.e. everything which is, are the four elements, earth water air ether, and The God.1 Outside of these there is nothing else: and we cannot call this the world, because the world is not the whole.2 The God is a certain divine spirit, which, permeating the four elements, brings all things into being. If, therefore, all things originate from the elements and from The God, they have one origin and the nature of all things is the same (par). But let us see what part of us is from The God and what part from the four elements. As far as is given to us to understand, we have the body from the elements, the soul from The God. Which is proven from this, that there are earth, moisture, breath and heat in the body, which are all visible, just as the elements are, and the soul is invisible, just as The God, from which it traces its origin, is. The former, furthermore, are unthinking, like the body; whereas The God has reason, like the soul.3 Next, we observe that the elements are subject to change, since it is their particular attribute (proprium) to change, like the body, which traces its origin from them, does; whereas it is obvious that The God does not perish.4 Therefore neither does the soul perish, which traces its origin from there; for the particular (pars) always behaves according to the category (genus). Now, this is where Anchises was intending to go from the start, to show that the souls are immortal.

(3) But the following problem arises: if they are immortal and have one first principle, for what reason do we living beings not all have the same thoughts (sentimus similiter)? And he says that the difference is not in the souls, but in the bodies; to the extent that these are lively or torpid, they make the soul likewise. Which can be proven in one and the same body of a single animal. For in a healthy body, there is one kind of liveliness of mind, but in a diseased one, it is more sluggish, and in a sufficiently sick one, it even lacks reason, as we observe in phrenetics.5 Indeed, when it has come to the body, it does not employ its own nature, but is changed according to the qualities of the body. This is why we see that Afri (North Africans) are sly, Greeks fickle, and Gauls are of a more sluggish intellect; the nature of the climates does this, as Ptolemy observes,6 who says that a person brought to a different climate will partially change; but it is impossible to change entirely, because they receive the lot of their body in the beginning. So, the soul accords with the quality of the body.

1 Here ether is not a fifth element but simply the same as fire. “The God” (lat. deus = gr. ho theós) is the Stoic cosmic god, the pneuma/spirit that animates the cosmos. The linear commentary shows that the spirit is also understood as a kind of fire, not as an incorporeal substance (like the Platonic soul), even if Servius contrasts the spirit against “bodies”. This language is also found in Stoic philosophers. On the other hand, Servius sees the soul as immortal, which stands in contrast to Stoicism and in line with Platonism. So does much of what Servius says about the corrupting influence of the body on the soul. It may be that he did not see as much of a difference between the Stoic pneuma and the Platonic incorporeals as some of his contemporaries did.

2 Here, Servius seems to be distinguishing the nothing, i.e. the infinite empty space outside of the cosmos, from the world, so that the world is the all, tò pân, and the world plus the surrounding empty space is the whole, in Greek tò hólon. If so, this is reversed from what Sextus Empiricus attributes to the Stoics [Against the Professors 9.332]. The easiest explanation is that Servius or one of his sources became confused, perhaps because of a semantic difference between Greek and Latin. Either way, it’s not really of consequence for what follows.

3 Although the soul is distinguished from the body, spirit is not to be understood as incorporeal here. Servius is essentially following the Stoics (as is Vergil), and for them, every “thing” is a “body” in a wider sense (=corporeal).


5 Phrenesis is an ancient category of mental illness that gives rise to the modern words frenzy and frantic.


(4) And for what reason is the better thing in the power of the inferior? Rather the divine soul must have the body in its power, and the mortal body must not corrupt the nature of the soul. But it occurs for the following reason: because what contains is more than that which is contained. As when you shut a lion in a cave, it does not lose its power because it is impeded, but it cannot exercise it, so the soul does not pass over into the faults of the body, but is impeded by the connection with it, and does not exercise its own power.

(5) The following problem arises: anything that is corrupted is not eternal. If the soul raves, rages, desires, and fears, it lacks eternity, as the former are contraries of the latter. For undergoing something dissolves eternity. This we declare to be false for the following reason: because the soul does not undergo anything through itself, but suffers due to the connection with the body, and it is one thing to be corrupted through one’s own nature, another to be corrupted through the opposition of another thing. For we see how something, like in the case of a lamp, which through itself is bright and without any doubt illuminates the place in which it is, yet if it has been covered over and enclosed, it does not lose its own splendor, which is within it; for if the impediment is removed, it appears again, and just because its strength is impeded, it is not also corrupted. And so the soul, too, for as long as it is in the body, undergoes its contagions; but as soon as it lays off the body, it recovers its own power and employs its proper nature.

(6) But if it recovers its own nature, why does it undergo punishments in the underworld? For the following reason: because a thing that was connected with something for a long time cannot, when that other thing has been removed, immediately revert to its own splendor. As when you defile some bright article by throwing it into muck, and pick it up again immediately, it is not on that account free of dirt, but needs cleaning so that it can return to its original splendor – in the same way the soul, befouled by being given to the body, even if it lays off the body, needs to be purified.

(7) So, if they are purified and recover their own nature, why do they want to go back? Because, says Anchises, they drink forgetfulness. But this is also ambiguous: either in order to forget the previous punishments, or rather in order that, ignorant of the future, they should have a desire to return into bodies, which does not occur without passivity; for the soul in which there is passion deserves to go back.

Latin text (ed. )

(1) Interrogatus Anchises quare animae velint reverti ad corpora, quasi aliud dicit, tamen illuc recurrit.

(2) Quod graece τὸ πᾶν dicitur, id est omne quod est, quattuor sunt elementa: terra, aqua, aër, aether et deus. praeter haec nihil est aliud; et hoc mundum non possumus dicere; nam mundus non est totum. Ergo deus est quidam spiritus divinus qui per quattuor infusus elementa gignit universa. Igitur si de elementis et deo nascuntur omnia, unam originem habent et par est natura omnium. Sed videamus quid in nobis est a deo et quid a quattuor elementis. Quantum datur intellegi, ab elementis habemus corpus, a deo animum: quod ideo probatur, quia est in corpore terra, umor, anhelitus, calor, quae omnia videntur, sicut etiam elementa, animus invisibilis est, sicut etiam deus, unde originem ducit. Illa praeterea inrationabilia sunt, sicut corpus: contra deus habet consilium, sicut etiam animus. Deinde elementa mutari videmus, quorum proprium mutari est, sicut etiam corpus, quod inde originem ducit; contra deum non perire manifestum est. Ergo nec animus perit, qui inde originem ducit; nam pars semper sequitur genus. Huc igitur tetendit primam intentionem suam ut animos inmortales doceret.

(3) Sed occurrit illud: si immortales sunt et unum habent principium, qua ratione non omnia animalia sentimus similiter? Et dicit non esse in animis dissimilitudinem, sed in corporibus, quae prout fuerint vel vivacia vel torpentia, tales et animos faciunt. Quod potest etiam in uno eodemque animalis corpore probari. In sano enim corpore alia est vivacitas mentis, in aegro pigrior, in satis invalido etiam ratione carens, ut in phreneticis cernimus: adeo cum ad corpus venerit, non natura sua utitur, sed ex eius qualitate mutatur. inde Afros versipelles, Graecos leves, Gallos pigrioris videmus ingenii: quod natura climatum facit, sicut Ptolomaeus deprehendit, qui dicit translatum ad aliud clima hominem naturam ex parte mutare; de toto enim non potest, quia in principio accepit sortem corporis sui. Ergo anima pro qualitate est corporis.

(4) Et qua ratione res melior est in potestate deterioris? Atqui divinus animus debuit corpus habere in potestate, non mortale corpus naturam animi corrumpere. Sed hoc ideo fit, quia plus est quod continet, quam quod continetur. Ut si leonem includas in caveam, impeditus vim suam non perdit, sed exercere non potest, ita animus non transit in vitia corporis, sed eius coniunctione impeditur nec exercet vim suam.

(5) Occurrit illud: omne quod corrumpitur aeternum non est. Si animus insanit, irascitur, desiderat, timet, caret aeternitate, cui sunt ista contraria: nam passio aeternitatem resolvit. Quod ideo falsum esse dicimus, quia animus per se nihil patitur, sed laborat ex corporis coniunctione, et aliud est per suam naturam corrumpi, aliud per contrarium rei alterius. Videmus enim tale aliquid, ut in lucerna, quae per se clara est et locum in quo est sine dubio inluminat, sed si qua re tecta fuerit et inclusa, non perdit splendorem proprium qui in ea est; remoto namque inpedimento apparet, nec tamen quia impeditus est eius vigor, ideo etiam corruptus. Ita ergo et animus quamdiu est in corpore, patitur eius contagiones: simul atque deposuerit corpus, recipit suum vigorem et natura utitur propria.

(6) Si ergo recipit naturam suam, quare poenas apud inferos patitur? Ideo quia res quae simul diu fuit, non potest deposita ipsa re statim ad suum nitorem reverti. Ut si speciem candidam missam in lutum polluas et eam statim auferas, non idcirco sordibus caret, sed ablutionem requirit ut in pristinum nitorem possit redire: sic anima ex eo quod datur corpori inquinata, etiam si corpus deponat, necesse habet purgari.

(7) Si ergo purgantur et recipiunt naturam suam, cur volunt reverti? Quia potant, inquit, oblivia. Etiam est illud ambiguum: aut ut praeteritarum obliviscantur poenarum, aut certe ut ignarae futuri habeant desiderium redeundi in corpora, quod sine passione non fit; nam animus in quo est passio meretur reverti.

Text and Commentary

[703: above]

6.704: virgvlta sonantia silvae quae est iuxta praeripia fluminis.

6.705a: domos placidas campos Elysios.

6.705b: praenatat praeterfluit. et contrarie dictum est: nam non natant aquae, sed nos in ipsis natamus. Ennium igitur secutus est, qui ait „fluctusque natantes“. sane de hoc fluvio quaeritur a prudentioribus, utrum de illis novem sit, qui ambiunt inferos, an praeter novem. et datur intellegi quod ab illis novem, qui ambiunt inferos, separatus sit: namque volunt eum esse imaginem senectutis. nam animae nostrae vigent et alacres sunt et plenae memoria a pueritia usque ad virentem senectam, postea in nimia senectute omnis memoria labitur: qua lapsa mors intervenit, et animae in aliud corpus revertuntur. unde fingunt poetae animas Lethaeo hausto in corpus redire. ergo Lethaeus est oblivio, morti semper vicina.

6.706: gentes popvliqve innumerarum gentium et populorum animae.

6.708: floribvs insidvnt ‚insido illi rei‘, ut „insidat quantus miserae deus“. ‚insisto‘ autem ‚illam rem‘, ut „nulli fas casto sceleratum insistere limen“.

6.709: circvm lilia fvndvntvr {hoc est circumfunduntur} circum flores. {‚lilia‘ autem pro quibuslibet floribus,} speciem pro genere posuit.

6.711: flvmina porro longe remota: et est Graecum adverbium. bene autem Aenean longe a Lethaeo facit, quia adhuc iuvenis est.

6.712: agmine cursu, impetu: per quod ostendit cito iri ad senectam, quia tota celeritate usus labitur vitae.

6.713: animae qvibvs altera fato corpora debentvr sciendum non omnes animas ad corpora reverti: aliquae enim propter vitae merita non redeunt; aliquae redeunt propter malam vitam, aliquae propter fati necessitatem.

6.714: lethaei ad flvminis vndam si anima aeterna est et summi spiritus pars, qua ratione in corpore non totum videt, nec est tantae {prudentiae tantaeque} vivacitatis, ut omnia possit agnoscere? quia cum coeperit in corpus descendere, potat stultitiam et oblivionem, unde non potest implere vim numinis sui post naturae suae oblivionem. obliviscitur autem secundum poetas praeteritorum, secundum philosophos futuri: unde medium tenuit dicendo ‚oblivia‘. docent autem philosophi, anima descendens quid per singulos circulos perdat: unde etiam mathematici fingunt, quod singulorum numinum potestatibus corpus et anima nostra conexa sunt ea ratione, quia cum descendunt animae trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, libidinem Veneris, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium: quae res faciunt perturbationem animabus, ne possint uti vigore suo et viribus propriis.

6.715: secvros latices qui securos faciunt, ut morbos pallidos dicimus, quod pallidos faciunt.

6.717: iampridem ex quo ait „tunc genus omne tuum et quae dentur moenia disces“.

719a: o pater nova brevitas: nam dicendo ‚o pater‘ qui loquatur ostenditur.

719b: ad caelvm hinc ire pvtandvm est miscet philosophiae figmenta poetica et ostendit tam quod est vulgare, quam quod continet veritas et ratio naturalis. nam secundum poetas hoc dicit: credendum est animas ab inferis reverti posse ad corpora? ut ‚caelum‘ superos intellegamus, id est nostram vitam. secundum philosophos vero hoc dicit: credendum est animas corporis contagione pollutas ad caelum reverti?

720a: sublimines animas non omnes, sed sublimium.

720b: tarda reverti corpora animae comparatione, qua velocius nihil est: uno enim momento potest universa discurrere.

721: qvae lvcis miseris tam dira cvpido ut id desiderent, propter quod se sciunt poenas dedisse, scilicet vitam.

722: svspensvm sollicitum, incertum, ut „multo suspensum numine ducit“.

723: svscipit anchises atqve ordine singvla pandit hysteroproteron: post hunc enim versum sequi debuit ‚dicam equidem nec te suspensum, nate, tenebo‘.

[724: above]

725a: lvcentemqve globvm lvnae ideo usus est participio, ut ostendat eam suum lumen non habere: nam ‚lucens‘ est quod aliunde inluminatur, ‚lucibile‘ quod per se lucet, ut ‚patulum‘ quod semper patet, ‚patens‘ quod et aperitur et clauditur, ut oculi, os. ‚globum‘ autem ideo, quia dicitur luna σφαιροειδὴς esse.

725b: titaniaqve astra aut stellas dicit, aut solem, quem et supra unum fuisse de Titanibus diximus.

726a: spiritvs divinus scilicet. et unum est sive mentem dicat, sive animum, sive spiritum.

726b: intvs alit vegetat et in aeternitatem custodit, quia mixtus est et nulla pars est elementi sine deo.

726c: per artvs per elementa, quae membra sunt mundi: corporalia namque sunt, quippe quae possunt videri.

727a: mens agitat molem magnitudinem mundi mens agitat. et si, ut Cicero dicit in Tusculanis, aeternum est quicquid in aeterno motu est, sine dubio etiam animus aeternus est: semper enim in motu est, adeo ut ne nobis quidem quiescentibus conquiescat.

727b: magno se corpore miscet aut antiptosis est pro ‚corpori‘, ut „haeret pede pes densusque viro vir“: quod potius credendum est: aut certe secundum eos locutus est, qui dicunt deum corporalem esse et eum ita definiunt πῦρ νοερὸν, id est ignem sensualem. quod si verum est, corpus est, nec per antiptosin dixit, sed per definitionem ‚magno corpore‘, id est non communi.

728: inde hominvm pecvdvmqve genvs de quattuor elementis et deo.

730: et caelestis origo seminibvs qvantvm non noxia corpora tardant quod supra diximus, in tantum, inquit, in hominibus viget pars divinitatis, in quantum sinit corporum qualitas.

732a: terreniqve hebetant artvs in quantum non hebetant.

732b: moribvndaqve membra morienti similia, hoc est semper morien- tia: numquam enim in eodem statu sunt, sed aut minuuntur aut crescunt. ergo animus idem est, sed uti viribus suis non potest propter corporis coniunctionem.

733: hinc metvvnt cvpivntqve dolent gavdentqve ex corporis coniunctione et hebetudine. Varro et omnes philosophi dicunt quattuor esse passiones, duas a bonis opinatis et duas a malis opinatis rebus: nam dolere et timere duae opiniones malae sunt, una praesentis, alia futuri: item gaudere et cupere opiniones bonae sunt, una praesentis, altera futuri. haec ergo nascuntur ex ipsa coniunctione, nam neque animi sunt neque corporis propria: pereunt enim facta segregatione.

734a: neqve avras respicivnt nam quia cohaerent corpori, obliviscuntur naturae suae, quam ‚auras‘ vocavit.

734b: clavsae tenebris et carcere caeco definitiones sunt corporis.

735: qvin et svpremo cvm lvmine vita reliqvit quia, ut diximus, occurrit debere eas statim post corpus depositum redire in suum vigorem. et dicit non posse: quae enim diu con- iuncta sunt invicem se tenent et trahunt reliquias sordium antiquarum.

736: non tamen omne malvm cedit, sed non omne; nam remanet quod ut purgetur necesse est. inde est quod dicit „eadem sequitur tellure repostos“. bene autem ‚miseris‘, quae etiam post corpus habeant corporis sordes: unde est ’nec funditus omnes corporeae excedunt pestes‘.

738a: div concreta ‚concreta‘ coniuncta et conglutinata.

738b: inolescere concrescere, ut „udoque docent inolescere libro“.

739: ergo exercentvr poenis quia deposito corpore sordes supersunt. poenas autem non perferunt animae, sed illius coniunctionis reliquiae, quae fuit inter animam et corpus: nam licet ista duo per se poenas perferre non possint, homo tamen perfert, qui de his duobus est factus.

740: svpplicia expendvnt ideo agunt supplicia, non ut animas puniant, sed ut eas peccatis exuant pristinis.

741: aliae pandvntvr inanes svspensae ad ventos loquitur quidem poetice de purgatione animarum, tangit tamen quod et philosophi dicunt. nam triplex est omnis purgatio. aut enim in terra purgantur quae nimis oppressae sordibus fuerint, deditae scilicet corporalibus blandimentis, id est transeunt in corpora terrena: et hae igni dicuntur purgari; ignis enim ex terra est quo exuruntur omnia, nam caelestis nihil perurit: aut in aqua, id est transeunt in corpora marina, si paulo melius vixerint: aut certe in aëre, transeundo scilicet in aëria corpora, si satis bene vixerint. quod in Statio legimus, ubi de auguriis tractat. unde etiam in sacris omnibus tres sunt istae purgationes: nam aut taeda purgant et sulphure, aut aqua abluunt, aut aëre ventilant, quod erat in sacris Liberi: hoc est enim „tibique oscilla ex alta suspendunt mollia pinu“; nam genus erat purgationis. et in ipsis purgationibus bonum meritorum secutus est ordinem, ut ante aëriam, inde aquae, post ignis diceret purgationem.

743a: qvisqve svos patimvr manes supplicia quae sunt apud manes, ut si quis dicat ‚iudicium patimur‘ et significet ea quae in iudicio continentur. est et aliud verius. nam cum nascimur, duos genios sortimur: unus est qui hortatur ad bona, alter qui depravat ad mala. quibus adsistentibus post mortem aut adserimur in meliorem vitam, aut condemnamur in deteriorem; per quos aut vacatio- nem meremur, aut reditum in corpora. ergo ‚manes‘ genios dicit, quos cum vita sortimur.

743b: exinde una pars orationis est, et ter- tia a fine accentum habet, licet paenultima longa sit: quod ideo factum est, ut ostenderetur una pars esse orationis, ne praepositio iungeretur adverbio, quod vitiosum esse non dubium est.

744: pavci laeta arva tenemvs non omnes: qui enim minus purgantur statim redeunt ad corpora.

745a: donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe quia etiam post purgationem opus est tempore, ut perseveret in purgatione et sic redeat. et quaeritur utrum animae per apotheosin, de quibus ait ‚pauci laeta arva tenemus‘, possint mereri perpetuam vacationem. quod non potest fieri: merentur enim temporis multi, non perpetuitatis, et quae male vixerunt statim redeunt, quae melius, tardius, quae optime, diutissimo tempore sunt cum numinibus. paucae tamen sunt, quae et ipsae exigente ratione, licet tarde, coguntur reverti.

745b: perfecto temporis orbe finito legitimo tempore.

746: concretam adfixam et inhaerentem.

747a: aetherivm sensvm πῦρ νοερὸν, ignem sensualem, id est deum: per quod quid sit anima ostendit.

747b: avrai simplicis ignem non urentis. ’simplicis‘ autem nostri conparatione, qui constat de ligno et aëre: ille enim per se plenus est et aeternus, quia simplex. omnia enim σύνθετα, id est composita, exitum sortiuntur, unde et atomos perpetuas dicunt, quia simplices sunt nec recipiunt sectionem.

748a: has omnes ac si diceret ‚etiam has omnes‘; nam supra non omnes dixit, sed ‚animae, quibus altera fato corpora debentur‘.

748b: rotam volvere per annos exegerunt statutum tem- pus per annorum volubilitatem. est autem sermo Ennii.

749a: devs evocat non dicit quis, sicut supra „di, quibus imperium est animarum“. sed alii Mercurium volunt propter hoc „hac animas ille evocat orco pallentes, alias sub Tartara tristia mittit“. et est ratio: nam νοῦς dicitur, id est sensus, quo philosophiam, quae haec indicat, intellegimus, quia ipse etiam invenit litteras.

749b: agmine magno impetu. et dictum est imperative, ἀπειλητικῶς: non enim blanditiis inductae redeunt, sed necessitate quadam coguntur ut potantes velint reverti.

750: inmemores vel praeteritorum, vel futurorum.

752: dixerat anchises ante dicta de reversione animarum probatio huc tetendit, ut celebret Romanos et praecipue Augustum: nam qui bene considerant, inveniunt omnem Romanam historiam ab Aeneae adventu usque ad sua tempora summatim celebrasse Vergilium. quod ideo latet, quia confusus est ordo: nam eversio Ilii et Aeneae errores, adventus bellumque manifesta sunt: Albanos reges, Romanos etiam consulesque, Brutum, Catonem, Caesarem, Augustum et multa ad historiam pertinentia hic indicat locus, cetera, quae hic intermissa sunt, in ἀσπιδοποιΐα commemorat. unde etiam in antiquis invenimus, opus hoc appellatum esse non Aeneidem, sed gesta populi Romani: quod ideo mutatum est, quia nomen non a parte, sed a toto debet dari.